Focus: Hydro-hegemon, Hydro-megalomania, Hydro-power I

In this post, I delve deeper into Southern Africa’s hydropolitical landscape. I shall also explore South Africa’s megalomaniac transboundary schemes, including Lesotho Highlands Water Project (LHWP) as suggested by others’ blog comments.

Due to asymmetrical power-relations, transboundary river basins and riparian states are considered either pivotal or impacted; see Figure 4 (Turton and Ashton 2008). South Africa is a pivotal state due to its relatively high economic development of which heavily relies on transboundary waters (Turton 2005). Impacted states, like Lesotho, lack the social capital or resources – ‘institutional gap’ – to address hydropolitical exploitation (Kitissou 2007). Likewise, pivotal basins have strategic momentum whereas impacted basins entail hydro-hegemons throttling equitable use for impacted states (Turton 2005). Consequently, a tragedy of the commons can ensue whereby pivotal states sacrifice regional water equity to attain national water security. 

Figure 4: Diagram illustrating pivotal and impacted relationships within Southern Africa. 

Source: Turton and Ashton (2008).

Van der Zaag (2005) asserts power-relations favour the upstream state through controlling possible opportunities for downstream co-riparians. However, I would disagree in regards to Orange-Senqu River because upstream Lesotho is the impacted state and downstream South Africa has the advantageous power-positionality. The hydro-hegemon model cited in Goulden et al. (2009: 822) better explains Orange-Senqu’s situation, whereby the hydro-hegemon (South Africa) “determines if interactions are cooperative or competitive over transboundary resources and whether benefits reach weaker co-riparians”. As seen during Lesotho’s 1998 coup, a rapid, forceful SADC intervention led by South Africa’s military ensued (Turton 2005). Water, than humanitarian, concerns were most likely the motive behind deployment of troops so to secure LHWP’s continued running of infrastructure and water, which South Africa depends on (Giordano et al. 2002). Therefore, South Africa has always had hegemonic capability to restore and coerce any 'rebellion' in Lesotho's transboundary basin use. Wolf (1999) also agrees with the above model; conflict most likely occurs when the hydro-hegemon is downstream and/or upstream riparians inaugurate actions (coup, civil war) that decrease water resources.

Additionally, Yoffe et al. (2004) have conceived the Water Event Intensity Scale spanning from total war (-7) to voluntary unification (7) as well as factors for ‘Basin-at-Risk’ (Figure 5). These include hostile relations and variable/extreme climate, both found in South Africa. For instance during its Apartheid regime, South Africa was isolated by regional riparians who formed a counter-hegemonic coalition (Turton 2005). Evidently, domestic conditions can influence and drive interstate relations over transboundary waters (Giordano et al. 2002). South Africa’s hydro-hegemony was most securitised here, but megalomania of transboundary waters still continues after the Apartheid.

Figure 5: Water Event Intensity Scale. 

Source: Yoffe et al. (2004).

References
Giordano, M., M. Giordano and A.T. Wolf (2002) “The Geography of Water Conflict and Cooperation: Internal Pressures and International Manifestations”, The Geographical Journal, 168, 4, 293-312.

Goulden, M., D. Conway and A. Perschino (2009) “Adaptation to Climate Change in International Rivers Basins in Africa”, Hydrological Sciences Journal, 54, 5, 805-828.

Kitissou, M. (2007) “Water in the Context of Africa: Geopolitics and Geo-economics”, in M. Kitissou, M. Ndulo, M. Nagel and M. Grieco (eds) The Hydropolitics of Africa: A Contemporary Challenge, Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 1-18.

Turton, A.R. (2005) “Hydro Hegemony in the Context of the Orange River Basin” [WWW], paper presented at the Workshop on Hydro-Hegemony hosted by Kings College and School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), 20-21 May 2005, London (http://www.awiru.co.za/pdf/5Hydro%20Hegemony %20in%20the%20Context%20of%20the%20Orange%20River%20Basin.pdf; 10 Jan 2016).

Turton, A.R. and P.J. Ashton (2008) “Basin Closure and Issues of Scale: The Southern African Hydropolitical”, Water Resources Development, 24, 2, 305-318.

Van der Zaag, P. (2005) “Integrated Water Resources Management: Relevant Concept or Irrelevant Buzzword? A Capacity Building and Research Agenda for Southern Africa”, Physics and Chemistry of the Earth, 30, 867-871.

Yoffe, S., G. Fiske, M. Giordano, M. Giordano, K. Larson, K. Stahl and A.T. Wolf (2004) “Geography of International Water Conflict and Cooperation: Data Sets and Applications”, Water Resources Research, 40, 5, W05S04.

Focus: International (Trick or) Treaties

According to Figure 2 (UNEP 2006), Southern Africa’s basins have a high water stress index compared to sub-Saharan Africa overall. However this measurement, amongst its other flaws, presumes co-riparians share transboundary waters equitably (Taylor 2004). Therefore, this week’s blogpost shall establish Southern Africa’s transboundary water-sharing treaties.

Figure 2: Map on Africa’s pivotal basins and their Water Stress Index. 

Source: UNEP (2006).

After the apartheid’s demise, South Africa designated water as a universal right for all and the state as its trustee under 1998 National Water Act (Giordano et al. 2002). Its membership of aforementioned SADC also meant enshrining the 1997 UN Water Convention, thereby improving regional relations. This obliges riparian states to communicate and cooperate on the ‘reasonable and equitable use’ of transboundary waters (Wolf 1999). Conversely the treaty’s principles can contradict, such as co-riparians ‘avoiding significant harm’ and ‘reasonable usage’ (Wolf 1999). Likewise, its legally elusive language, unranked principles and weak supranational enforcements can create openings for hydro-hegemon South Africa to violate and employ coercive bargaining (Taylor 2004). Therefore, cooperation is not inherently harmonious, but better understood as a response to (potential) conflicts (Goulden et al. 2009).

Treaties normally embroil into Wolf’s (1999) territorial sovereignty vs. riverine integrity. The former claims a state "has absolute rights to water flowing through its territory" as the origin point (hydrography), whilst the latter argues states must maintain the transboundary integrity of that river, i.e. chronology or existing/historic rights (Taylor 2004: 17). Regarding the region’s key Orange-Senqu River basin (see Figure 3), upstream Lesotho as origin source can argue territorial sovereignty whereas downstream states – Botswana, Namibia, South Africa – argue for riverine integrity. Since South Africa "can project power beyond its national borders" (Turton 2005: 1) and supposedly has ‘more need’ for water (economy), it becomes difficult to achieve transboundary equity.

Figure 3: Map showing South Africa’s major transboundary rivers. 

Source: Turton and Ashton (2008).

However, the most economically developed (downstream) riparians receive the least rainfall, which is further aggravated by Orange-Senqu having the lowest continental basin discharge (Goulden et al. 2009). Increasing water scarcity would limit economic development. Thus, co-riparians may live peacefully during abundance but when it threatens the national interest, powerful states behave aggressively (securitisation) (Kitissou 2007). Orange-Senqu could even be a ‘Basin-at-Risk’ because of South Africa’s history of conflicts over resource scarcity (Turton and Ashton 2008). This perhaps explains Orange-Senqu River Commission’s recently low score (45.45) in Water Cooperation Quotients compared to SADC (100) (Strategic Foresight Group 2015). This is why I strongly agree with Wolf (1999); it is better to equally share the benefits (e.g. wealth) resulting from transboundary waters, than the ‘physical’ water. Bounding hydrology could unite instead of divide Africa!

References

Giordano, M., M. Giordano and A.T. Wolf (2002) “The Geography of Water Conflict and Cooperation: Internal Pressures and International Manifestations”, The Geographical Journal, 168, 4, 293-312.

Goulden, M., D. Conway and A. Perschino (2009) “Adaptation to Climate Change in International Rivers Basins in Africa”, Hydrological Sciences Journal, 54, 5, 805-828.

Kitissou, M. (2007) “Water in the Context of Africa: Geopolitics and Geo-economics”, in M. Kitissou, M. Ndulo, M. Nagel and M. Grieco (eds) The Hydropolitics of Africa: A Contemporary Challenge, Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 1-18.

Strategic Foresight Group (2015) “Water Cooperation Quotient” [WWW], Mumbai: Strategic Foresight Group (http://www.strategicforesight.com/publication_pdf/28799WCQ-web.pdf; 12 Jan 2016). 

Taylor, R.G. (2004) “Water Resources and Development Challenges in Eastern and Southern Africa”, In T. Bowyer-Bower and D. Potts (eds) East and Southern Africa: Regional Development Text, RGS-IBG Developing Areas Research Group, London: Addison-Wesley Longman, Chapter 8.

Turton, A.R. (2005) “Hydro Hegemony in the Context of the Orange River Basin” [WWW], paper presented at the Workshop on Hydro-Hegemony hosted by Kings College and School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), 20-21 May 2005, London (http://www.awiru.co.za/pdf/5Hydro%20Hegemony%20in%20the%20Context%20of%20the%20Orange%20River%20Basin.pdf; 10 Jan 2016).

Turton, A.R. and P.J. Ashton (2008) “Basin Closure and Issues of Scale: The Southern African Hydropolitical”, Water Resources Development, 24, 2, 305-318.

United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) (2006) “Water Scarcity Index” [WWW], Nairobi: UNEP (http://www.unep.org/dewa/vitalwater/article77.html; 10 Jan 2016).

Wolf, A.T. (1999) “Criteria for Equitable Allocations: The Heart of International Water Conflict”, Natural Resources Forum, 23, 3-15.